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Abstract
Mixed oligopolies are characterized by private and public enterprises. Entry into these
markets was restrictive, but has now been relaxed by deregulations; as a result, private firms
have entered mixed oligopolies. An increase in the number of private firms increases competition
among private firms and reduces the profit of incumbent private firms, given the privatization
policy remains unchanged. However, an increase in the number of private firms may in turn
affect privatization policy, and thus, indirectly affect private firms’ profits. Therefore, the overall
effect on private firms’ profit is ambiguous. In this study, we thus investigate how the number
of private firms affects the profit of each private firm in mixed oligopolies. For this end, we use
a linear-quadratic production cost function, which covers two popular model formulations in
the mixed oligopoly literature. We show that, if the degree of privatization is exogenous, the
profit of each private firm is decreasing in the number of private firms. However, if the degree
of privatization is endogenous, the relationship between the number of private firms and profit
takes an inverted-U shape under a plausible range of cost parameters. Our results imply that
there can exist multiple equilibria in free-entry markets with different degrees of privatization.
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1 Introduction
Despite the global trend of state-owned public enterprises towards privatization, public enterprises
with substantial ownership shares from public sectors remain active in various industries and
manage a significant ratio of the world’s resources (Megginson and Netter, 2001; La Porta et
al., 2002). According to an OECD report, over 10% of the 2,000 largest companies are public
enterprises, with sales equivalent to approximately 6% of global GDP (Kowalski et al., 2013).
Chinese, Russian, and Indian public enterprises, in particular, occupy significant positions in many
industries (Gupta, 2005; Chen, 2017; Fridman, 2018).
Public enterprises managed to prevent private monopolies in natural monopoly markets because
of significant economies of scale in these markets. However, due to recent technological progress and
expansion of market size, many markets that contain public enterprises are no longer characterized
by significant economies of scale. As a result, a number of public enterprises coexist with private
enterprises in a wide range of industries.1 We call the markets in which both private and public
firms coexist mixed oligopolies.
Moreover, recent deregulation has significantly loosened the entry and exit restrictions in mixed
oligopolies, and private enterprises have therefore entered many mixed oligopolies in industries such
as energy, telecommunications, transportation, banking, and insurance. The optimal privatization
policies in these mixed oligopolies and their economic consequences have attracted extensive at-
tention from economic, legal, and political science researchers, as well as policymakers.2
The literature showed that an increase in the number of private firms raises the optimal degree
of privatization (Lin and Matsumura, 2012; Matsumura and Okamura, 2015), which in turn reduces
the output of the public firm; thus, it raises the profit of each private firm.3 However, given the
1Examples include the United States Postal Service, Amtrak, TVA, La Poste, KfW, Volkswagen, Renault, Areva,
Japan Post, Development Bank of Japan, Tokyo Electric Power Corporation, Korea Electric Power Corporation,
Indian Telecommunications Service, National Aviation Company of India Limited, Gazprom, PJSC Aeroflot Russian
Airlines, PetroChina Company, and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation.
2For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in this field, see Escrihuela-Villar and Gutie´rrez-Hita
(2018), Kim et al. (2019), Mahanta (2019), and the works cited therein.
3For example, in the Japanese banking industry, the number of firms declined continuously, and the privatization
programs of public banks were postponed and downscaled. By contrast, in the Japanese electric power industry, the
number of firms continuously increased, and J-Power was fully privatized. These facts are consistent with the above
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privatization policy, an increase in the number of private firms strengthens the competition among
private firms, reducing the profit of each private firm. Therefore, it is ambiguous whether an
increase in the number of private firms leads more or less competition in mixed oligopolies under
endogenous privatization policies.4
The above concern regarding an increase in number of firms versus profit is significant for two
reasons. First, if an increase in the number of private firms increases the profit of private firms,
the number of firms many be an inappropriate measure of the competitiveness in the market. In
other words, a larger number of firms may indicate less acerbic competition in mixed oligopolies.
Thus, this result has implications for the context of anti-trust policies in mixed oligopolies.
Second, if an increase in the number of private firms increases the profit of private firms, then
a new entry in the market triggers the entry of other private firms in free-entry markets, making
the long-run equilibrium unstable. Several studies on free-entry mixed oligopolies assumed that
the profit of each private firm decreases as the number of private firms increases (Matsumura and
Kanda, 2005; Lee et al., 2018); however, this assumption may be problematic. Therefore, the
relationship between the profit of each firm and the number of private firms should be investigated
to clarify the long-run equilibrium stability.
Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020a) investigated a mixed oligopoly model with constant marginal
costs, and showed that each private firm’s profit is increasing in the number of private firms unless
the optimal degree of privatization is one (i.e., unless the optimal public ownership share is zero).
Although models with constant marginal costs are popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies
(Pal, 1998), models with increasing marginal costs are further popular in mixed oligopolies (De
Fraja and Delbono, 1989, Matsumura and Shimizu, 2010). Moreover, in the mixed oligopoly liter-
ature on free-entry markets, increasing marginal costs are standard and most studies adopt them.
Therefore, it is essential to investigate this problem under increasing marginal costs.
In addition, even in a non-free-entry market, constant marginal cost and increasing marginal
theoretical results.
4Incumbent firms’ profits can increase with a new entry even in private oligopolies. See Coughlan and Soberman
(2005), Chen and Riordan (2007), Ishibashi and Matsushima (2009), Mukherjee and Zhao (2009), and Ishida et al.
(2011). However, our approach is different from theirs because they do not discuss policy changes.
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cost models could have opposite policy implications on optimal privatization policies (Matsumura
and Okamura, 2015). Therefore, the implications of the results based on the constant marginal
cost assumption can be restrictive.5
We use a linear-quadratic production cost function that covers two popular model formulations
in the literature on mixed oligopolies— constant marginal cost and quadratic cost functions. We
find that, regardless whether the private firm’s marginal cost is constant or increasing, if the
public firm’s marginal cost is constant, each private firm’s profit is increasing in the number of
private firms, unless the public firm is fully privatized in equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium degree of
privatization is one). This result suggests that, as long as public firm’s marginal cost is constant,
either a public monopoly or a pure private oligopoly, in which the public firm is fully privatized,
emerges in equilibrium in free-entry markets.
However, if the public firm’s marginal cost is increasing, each private firm’s profit is either
decreasing in the number of private firms or has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number
of private firms. An inverted-U shaped relationship emerges when the coefficient of the quadratic
terms is small. When each private firm’s profit is decreasing in the number of private firms, there is
a unique long-run equilibrium (equilibrium under free entry), and it is stable. When an inverted-U
shaped relationship emerges between profit and the number of private firms, there can be three
long-run equilibria, and two are stable. Our results suggest that even under increasing marginal
costs, uniqueness of the long-run equilibria is not always guaranteed.
We also compare a mixed duopoly with a mixed triopoly and investigate whether a private
firm’s entry raises the incumbent private firm’s profit. We find that a new entry may raise the
incumbent private firm’s profit even when marginal costs are increasing. This result implies that
our main results hold even if we consider an integer constraint for the number of firms and cost
heterogeneity among private firms.
5Wang and Mukherjee (2012) investigated a Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with public leadership and Matsumura
and Sunada (2013) introduced advertising competition in mixed oligopolies. They showed that private firms’ profits
can be increasing in the number of private firms. However, the driving force of this study is different from theirs
because we consider neither sequential-move nor the advertising stage. Moreover, they assume constant marginal
costs, while we allow increasing marginal costs as well.
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The paper is divided into 6 sections. In section 2, we present the model. Section 3 presents
the equilibrium analysis and main results. Section 4 discusses the properties of free entry markets.
Section 5 compares a mixed duopoly with a mixed triopoly, and discusses whether a new entry of
private firm increases the profit of incumbent private firm. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a mixed oligopoly in which one public firm (firm 0) initially owned by the government
competes with n private firms (firms 1, 2,...,n). Let qi be firm i’s output. These firms produce
homogeneous products for which the inverse demand function is p(Q) = a − Q, where p denotes
price, a is a positive constant, and Q :=
∑n
i=0 qi. We assume that all private firms have an identical
cost function, although we allow public and private firms to have different cost functions.6 We
assume linear-quadratic cost functions. The public firm’s cost function is c0(q0) = γ0q0+ (κ0/2)q
2
0
and each private firm i’s ci(qi) = γqi + (κ/2)q
2
i , where γ0, κ0, γ, and κ are non-negative constants.
This model formulation of demand and cost covers several popular settings in the literature on
mixed oligopolies. For example, if γ0 = γ = 0 and κ0 = κ > 0, this covers De Fraja and
Delbono’s (1989) model, which is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies.7 If γ0 > γ and
κ0 = κ = 0, this covers Pal’s (1998) model, which is another popular model in mixed oligopolies.
8
Our model covers these two popular models in the literature on mixed oligopolies. As Matsumura
and Okamura (2015) showed, two models can yield the opposite policy implications in mixed
oligopolies, and we thus believe that the model formulation covering these two models is important.
Following the standard assumption in this field, we define social welfare as the sum of consumer
surplus and profits of firms. Then, social welfare W is:
W =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − pQ+
n∑
i=0
pii =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq −
n∑
i=0
ci(qi).
6We relax this assumption in Section 5.
7De Fraja and Delbono (1989) assumed that public and private firms have identical cost functions; however, the
model allowing cost difference between public and private firms are also widely used (Matsumura and Shimizu, 2010;
Kawasaki et al., 2020).
8See also Mujumdar and Pal (1998) and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020a,b).
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Following Matsumura (1998), the public firm’s objective function is αpi0 + (1 − α)W .
9 α ∈ [0, 1]
represents the degree of privatization. Each private firm i’s objective function is its profit, pii.
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses α to maximize social
welfare. In the second stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its output to maximize its objective
function. We solve this game by backward induction and the equilibrium concept is the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this study, we assume interior solutions in the second stage. In other words, all
firms produce positive outputs.
3 Equilibrium and main results
First, we solve the second stage game given α. The first order-condition for each private firm is:
p+ p′q − γ − κq. (1)
The second-order condition is satisfied. The first-order condition of the public firm is:
p+ αp′q0 − γ0 − κ0q0. (2)
The second-order condition is satisfied.
These first-order conditions yield the following equilibrium quantities for the public and private
firms in the second stage subgames:
qS0 (α, n) =
(a− γ0)(1 + κ)− n(γ0 − γ)
(1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α)
, (3)
qS(α, n) =
(a− γ)(α+ κ0) + γ0 − γ
(1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α)
. (4)
Superscript S indicates the equilibrium outcomes in the second-stage subgame.
We respectively obtain the following equilibrium total output, price, each private firms’ profit,
9For empirical evidence supporting this formulation, see Ogura (2018), as well as Seim and Waldfogel (2013) for
empirical evidence for α = 0.
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and welfare:
QS(α, n) =
n(a− γ)(α+ κ0) + (1 + κ)(a− γ0)
(1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α)
, (5)
pS(α, n) =
(1 + κ)(a(α+ κ0) + γ0) + nγ(α+ κ0)
(1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α)
, (6)
piS(α, n) =
2 + κ
2
(
(α+ κ0)(a− γ) + γ0 − γ
(1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α)
)2
, (7)
WS(α, n) =
X1
2((1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α))2
. (8)
X1 and other coefficientsXi that repeatedly appear throughout the paper are reported in Appendix
A.
From (6) and (7), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) pS is decreasing in n. (ii) piS is decreasing in n.
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 states that the both price and each private firm’s profit are decreasing in n if α
is given exogenously, which is intuitive. An increase in the number of private firms strengthens
competition and reduces each firm’s output and the price, which reduces the profit of each private
firm.10
Next, we discuss the government’s welfare maximization problem in the first stage. Let αF
be the equilibrium degree of privatization (superscript F indicates the first-stage). The first-order
condition is:
∂WS(α)
∂α
= −
(a− γ0 + κ(a− γ0)− n(γ0 − γ))X2
((1 + α+ κ0)(1 + κ) + n(α+ κ0))3
= 0. (9)
The second-order condition is:
−
((a− γ0)(1 + κ)
2 − n(n+ 2)(γ0 − γ) + κn(a− 2γ0 − γ))
4
((1 + κ)(a− γ0)− n(γ0 − γ))2((1 + κ)2(1 + κ0) + n(κ+ 2κ0(1 + κ) + nκ0))3
< 0
and is satisfied under the assumption of the interior solution in the second stage (i.e., both q0 and
q are positive). The solution for (9), α∗, is:
α∗ =
(κ0(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)n
((1 + κ)2 + κn)a− ((1 + κ)(1 + κ+ 2n) + n2)γ0 + n(2 + κ+ n)γ
. (10)
10The public firm’s profit is also decreasing in n.
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Equilibrium α, αF is
αF = max{0,min{α∗, 1}}.
In other words, if the solution is interior (i.e., αF ∈ (0, 1)), αF = α∗.
From (10), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 α∗ is increasing in n.
Proof See Appendix B.
The literature presented this result in various contexts (Lin and Matsumura, 2012, Matsumura
and Okamura, 2015). An increase in α reduces the public firm’s output while increasing that of
private firms. The production substitution from the public firm to private firms improves welfare
(Matsumura, 1998).11 An increase in α reduces total output, thus reducing the consumer surplus.
The equilibrium α is determined by the trade-off of these two effects. An increase in n strengthens
the above welfare-improving effect because a larger number of private firms substitute the public
firm’s production. Moreover, an increase in n increases the total output given α, which weakens the
above welfare-reducing effect of an increase in α. Therefore, the equilibrium degree of privatization
is increasing in n unless it reaches the upper bound (i.e., one).
We then obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 (i) αF > 0 (i.e., the optimal degree of privatization is strictly positive). (ii) If
κ0 = κ > 0 and γ0 = γ, then α
F < 1 (i.e., if both public and private firms have an identical
cost function and the marginal cost is increasing, the optimal degree of privatization is less than
one). (iii) Suppose that the solution in the first stage is interior (i.e., αF < 1). Then, piF (n) is
increasing in n if and only if
g(n) := (n2 + 2(κ+ 1)n+ (κ+ 1)2)κ0 − κ− 1 < 0. (11)
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 2(i,ii) has already been demonstrated under general demand and cost conditions
(Matsumura, 1998). From Proposition 2(i), the solution is interior if αF < 1.
11Lahiri and Ono (1988) comprehensively discussed the welfare-improving production substitution.
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Proposition 2(iii) is our main result. It states that each private firm’s profit can be increasing
in the number of private firms. In other words, a new entry of a private firm may increase
each incumbent private firm’s profit. Given α, each private firm’s profit decreases as n increases
(Proposition 1). However, α increases as n increases, which increases each private firm’s profit.
Proposition 2(iii) states that the latter effect can dominate the former.
We now present the properties of piF in detail. From Proposition 2, we obtain the following
result that highlights the conditions under which each private firm’s profit is increasing in n.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the solution in the first stage is interior (i.e., αF < 1). Then, (i)
piF (n) is either (a) increasing in n for any n, (b) decreasing in n for any n, or (c) inverted-U
shaped; (ii) (a) holds if and only if κ0 = 0; and (iii) (b) holds if κ0 ≥ κ and κ ≥ κ¯ ≃ 0.618.
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 3(i) states that various relationships between the number of private firms and the
profit for each private firm can emerge in equilibrium. Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020a) showed
that each private firm’s profit is increasing in n when the marginal costs of all firms are constant
(i.e., if κ0 = κ = 0). Proposition 3(ii) states that this holds if the marginal cost of the public firm
is constant, regardless whether the private firm’s marginal cost is constant or increasing. In other
words, only the assumption of constant marginal cost of the public firm is essential. Proposition
3 (iii) states that each private firm’s profit is decreasing in n if c′′ is large for both the public and
private firms.
It also states that each private firm’s profit can be increasing in n for small n, whereas it is
always decreasing in n for large n as long as the public firm’s marginal cost function is increasing.
This result suggests that, when c′′ is small, there can be multiple long-run equilibria (i.e., multiple
equilibria in the free-entry market), whereas a unique equilibrium exists when c′′ is large. We
discuss this point in the next section. Moreover, our results suggest that the number of firms may
be an inappropriate measure of the competitiveness of the market when κ is small because an
increase in the number of firms may lead to a weaker competition in mixed oligopolies due to the
change in privatization policy.
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Our results have another implication for the literature on mixed oligopolies. In their pioneering
work, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) assumed that γ0 = γ = 0 and κ0 = κ, allowing any positive
κ. However, some subsequent papers on mixed oligopolies assumed κ0 = κ = 1.
12 Our results
clearly show that the assumption κ0 = κ = 1 is not innocuous and can affect the properties of
equilibria. In other words, setting κ0 = κ = 1 is never normalized. Thus, we should carefully check
the robustness of the results based on this assumption.
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that an increase in n is more likely to increase each private firm’s
profit when κ0 is smaller. We explain the intuition. When κ0 is larger, a reduction in q0 caused
by a new entry (i.e., an increase in n) reduces firm 0’s marginal cost more significantly, which in
turn reduces the government’s incentive to raise α. Therefore, a new entry is less likely to increase
each private firm’s profit when κ0 is larger.
Moreover, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that an increase in n is more likely to increase each
private firm’s profit when n is smaller. We explain the intuition below. Suppose that κ0 > 0.
When n is smaller, the difference between the marginal cost of a public firm and each private firm
is larger. Thus, the production substitution from the public firm to the private firms improves
welfare more significantly. Therefore, an increase in n more significantly reduces α when n is
smaller, which is beneficial for private firms.
4 Free entry market
Here, we investigate a free-entry market in which n is endogenously determined by the zero profit
condition.13 When the private firm enters the market, it incurs an entry cost F > 0. In the first
stage, each private firm chooses whether to enter the market. In the second stage, the government
chooses α.14 In the third stage, firms face quantity competition.
The second and third stages were analyzed in the previous section. We discuss the first stage.
12See, among others, Wang and Chen (2011), Lee and Xu (2018), and Cho et al. (2019).
13Needless to say, zero profit means zero excess profit, and each private firm obtains normal profit.
14This is an entry-then-privatization model (Xu et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2018, Haraguchi and Matsumura, 2020a). If
the government chooses α before the entry of private firms, the equilibrium is unique, in contrast to the result in this
section. For the properties of privatization-then-entry, see Matsumura and Kanda (2005) and Cato and Matsumura
(2012).
As long as n > 0, the number of private firms is determined by the following zero profit condition.
piF (n) = F. (12)
If piF (0) < F , the public monopoly (i.e., n = 0) constitutes an equilibrium, although there may be
other equilibria in which (12) is satisfied for positive n.
We now present a result on the properties of long-run equilibria.
Proposition 4 (i) If
piF (0) =
(2 + κ)(κ0(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)
2
2(1 + κ0)2(1 + κ)2
> F, (13)
there exists a unique and stable equilibrium. (ii) If (13) is not satisfied, there exists an equilibrium
in which n = 0 and α = 0. (iii) If (13) is not satisfied and (κ+ 1)2κ0 − κ− 1 < 0, there exists F
that yields three equilibria.
Proof See Appendix B.
There are the following three patterns of long-run equilibria:
(1) Unique equilibrium is public monopoly equilibrium, in which nF = 0 and αF = 0.
(2) Unique equilibrium is mixed oligopoly or private oligopoly equilibrium, in which nF > 0 and
αF > 0.15
(3) There are three equilibria. One is public monopoly equilibrium, another is mixed oligopoly
equilibrium, and the last one is mixed or private oligopoly equilibrium.
Suppose case (a) in Proposition 3(i) emerges (i.e., pi is increasing in n as long as αF < 1). An
increase in n increases αF and eventually αF = 1 holds. Then, a further increase in n decreases
pi because αF = 1 regardless of n, and thus, pi is decreasing in n (Proposition 1(ii)). Therefore,
the relationship between pi and n is inverted-U shape, and all of (1)–(3) can emerge, depending on
pi(0) (see Figure 1). The same is true when case (c) in Proposition 3 emerges.
Suppose case (b) in Proposition 3(i) emerges. Because pi is decreasing in n, either (1) or (2)
emerges, depending on pi(0). In other words, the equilibrium is always unique (see Figure 2).
15We call it a private oligopoly equilibrium if αF = 1 because all firms are owned by the private sector.
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Figure 1-1 Figure 1-2 Figure 1-3
Figure 1: Numerical examples of piF (n)− F where a = 100, γ0 = 2, γ = 1, κ0 = 0.1, and κ = 0.2.
F = 170, 60, and 100 in Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3, respectively.
Figure 2-1
Figure 2-2
Figure 2: Numerical examples of piF (n) − F where a = 100, γ0 = 2, γ = 1, and κ0 = κ = 1.
F = 1000 and 300 in Figures 2-1 and 2-2, respectively.
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If κ0 is small, multiple equilibria may exist and one of them is the public monopoly equilibrium.
As we have shown in the previous section, if κ0 is small, pi
F (n) is increasing in n for small n.
This yields multiple equilibria, both public monopoly and mixed or private oligopoly equilibria.
If private firms expect that other firms will enter the market, they expect that the equilibrium
degree of privatization will be large, which increases the profit of each entrant. Therefore, each
potential entrant has an incentive to enter the market, yielding a mixed or a private oligopoly
equilibrium. If each private firm expects that other firms will not enter the market, the equilibrium
degree of privatization will be small, which reduces the profit of each entrant. Therefore, each
potential entrant does not enter the market. Under these conditions, multiple self-fulfilling long-
run equilibria exist.
5 Integer constraint and heterogeneity among private firms
In the previous sections, we treated n as a continuous variable and ignored the integer constraint
of the number of firms. Moreover, we did not allow cost heterogeneity among private firms.16
The general analysis of heterogeneous private firms with the integer constraint is difficult and
intractable. Instead of this general analysis, we compare a mixed duopoly with a mixed triopoly
and investigate the effect of the new entry of a private firm. Firm 0 is a public firm and firms 1
and 2 are private firms. Firm i’s cost is γiqi + (κi/2)(qi)
2.
First, we discuss the mixed duopoly in which firms 0 and 1 compete. Let superscript DS be
the equilibrium outcomes at the second stage (quantity competition stage) in the duopoly.
In the quantity competition stage, the equilibrium outputs are:
qDS0 (α) =
(1 + κ1)(a− γ0)− (γ0 − γ1)
1 + κ1 + (2 + κ1)(α+ κ0)
,
qDS1 (α) =
(α+ κ0)(a− γ1) + (γ0 − γ1)
1 + κ1 + (2 + κ1)(α+ κ0)
.
16Although asymmetry in private firms is rarely discussed in the literature on mixed oligopolies, it affects the
equilibrium privatization policy. For asymmetric cost functions among private firms and their policy implications,
see Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020b,c). For asymmetric objective functions among private firms and their policy
implications, see Kim et al. (2019).
13
The resulting firm 1’s profit and welfare are:
piDS1 (α) =
(2 + κ1)((α+ κ0)(a− γ1) + γ0 − γ1)
2
2(1 + κ1 + (2 + κ1)(α+ κ0))2
,
WDS(α) =
X3
2(1 + κ1 + (2 + κ1)(α+ κ0))2
.
In the first stage, the government chooses α to maximize WDS . The first-order condition for
this maximization problem is:
∂WDS
∂α
= −
((1 + κ1)(a− γ0)− (γ0 − γ1))X4
(1 + κ1 + (2 + κ1)(α+ κ0))3
= 0. (14)
The second-order condition is:
−
(a− 4γ0 + 3γ1 + κ1(3a− 4γ0 + γ1) + κ
2
1
(a− γ0))
4
(a− 2γ0 + γ1 + κ1(a− γ0))2(1 + 4κ0(1 + κ1) + 3κ1 + κ2(1 + κ0))3
< 0
and is satisfied. The solution for (14), αD∗, is:
αD∗ =
κ0(a− γ1) + γ0 − γ1
a− 4γ0 + 3γ1 + κ1(3a− 4γ0 + γ1) + κ21(a− γ0)
. (15)
Let superscript DF denote the equilibrium outcomes at the first stage in the duopoly. Equilibrium
α, αDF is min{αD∗, 1}.17
Supposing that the solution is interior (i.e., αDF < 1), then:
piDF1 =
(2 + κ1)
3(γ0 − γ1 + κ0(a− γ1))
2
2(κ1 + (1 + κ1)2 + κ0(2 + κ1)2)2
. (16)
Second, we discuss the mixed triopoly in which firms 0, 1, and 2 compete. Let superscript TS
be the equilibrium outcomes at the second stage (quantity competition stage) in the triopoly.
In the quantity competition stage, the equilibrium outputs are:
qTS0 (α) =
a− 3γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + κ1(a− 2γ0 + γ2) + κ2(a− 2γ0 + γ1) + κ1κ2(a− γ0)
1 + 3(α+ κ0) + (κ1 + κ2)(1 + 2(α+ κ0)) + κ1κ2(1 + α+ κ0)
,
qTS1 (α) =
X5
1 + 3(α+ κ0) + (κ1 + κ2)(1 + 2(α+ κ0)) + κ1κ2(1 + α+ κ0)
,
qTS2 (α) =
X6
1 + 3(α+ κ0) + (κ1 + κ2)(1 + 2(α+ κ0)) + κ1κ2(1 + α+ κ0)
.
17We can show that αDF > 0 as long as all firms produce positive output in equilibrium.
14
The resulting firm 1’s profit and welfare are:
piTS1 (α) =
(2 + κ1)(X5)
2
2(1 + 3(α+ κ0) + (κ1 + κ2)(1 + 2(α+ κ0)) + κ1κ2(1 + α+ κ0))2
,
W TS(α) =
X7
2(1 + 3(α+ κ0) + (κ1 + κ2)(1 + 2(α+ κ0)) + κ1κ2(1 + α+ κ0))2
.
In the first stage, the government chooses α to maximize W TS . The first-order condition for
this maximization problem is:
∂W TS
∂α
= −
X8(αX9 −X10)
(1 + 3(α+ κ0) + (κ1 + κ2)(1 + 2(α+ κ0)) + κ1κ2(1 + α+ κ0))3
= 0. (17)
The second-order condition is:
−
(X11)
4
((1 + κ1)(1 + κ2)(a− γ0)− (1 + κ1)(γ0 − γ1)− (1 + κ2)(γ0 − γ2))2(X12)3
< 0
and is satisfied. The solution for (17), αT∗, is αT∗ = X10/X9. Let superscript TF denote the
equilibrium outcomes at the first stage in the triopoly. Equilibrium α, αTF is min{αT∗, 1}.18
Suppose that the solution is interior (i.e., αTF < 1). Then
piTF1 =
(2 + κ1)(X13)
2
2(X14)2
. (18)
Comparing (16) with (18), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Firm 2’s entry increases firm 1’s profit if and only if X15κ2 +X16 > 0.
Proof See Appendix B.
Firm 2’s entry may increase the degree of privatization, which may increase the profit of
incumbent firm 1. The condition X15κ2 +X16 > 0 is messy and complicated. However, we obtain
some results from this condition. First, suppose that κ0 = 0. Then, if κ2 is not too large or κ1 is
sufficiently large, firm 2’s entry increases firm 1’s profit. Second, if all firms have an identical cost
function, firm 2’s entry increases firm 1’s profit if κ ≤ κˆ ≈ 0.17. Again, this result suggests that
assumption κ0 = κ = 1, which is often adopted in the literature, is not innocuous and it can affect
the properties of equilibria. The threshold value of 0.17 is smaller than that in the previous section,
18We can show that αTF > 0 as long as all firms produce positive output in equilibrium.
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0.62. This implies that a new entry of the private firm is less likely to increase the incumbent’s
profit under the integer constraint of the number of firms, although this can happen even under
symmetric increasing marginal costs.
We now present the numerical results. In Figure 3, we set a = 10, γ0 = 2, and γ1 = γ2 = 1
and show the range of κ1, κ2 for X15κ2 +X16 > 0. Figure 3 suggests that firm 2’s entry is more
likely to increase firm 1’s profit when κ0 is smaller, κ1 is larger, and κ2 is smaller. A smaller
κ2 implies that the production substitution from firm 0 to firm 2 caused by an increase in α is
more likely to improve welfare. Thus, firm 2’s entry more significantly increases α when κ2 is
smaller, which increases firm 1’s profit more significantly. A larger κ1 implies that the production
substitution from firm 0 to firm 1 caused by an increase in α less likely improves welfare. Thus,
without firm 2’s entry, α is small, which increases the difference in α with or without firm 2’s
entry. Therefore, firm 2’s entry increases firm 1’s profit more significantly when κ1 is larger. As
mentioned after Proposition 3, when κ0 is large, a reduction in q0 caused by firm 2’s entry reduces
firm 0’s marginal cost, which reduces the government’s incentive to increase α.19 Therefore, firm
2’s entry less is likely to increase firm 1’s profit when κ0 is larger.
6 Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigate whether the new entry of a private firm increases private incumbent
firms’ profits. To achieve that, we adopt a linear-quadratic cost function that covers two popular
models in mixed oligopolies. We find that each private firm’s profit is either (a) increasing in the
number of private firms, (b) decreasing in the number of private firms, or (c) increasing (decreasing)
for small (large) number of private firms. Case (a) emerges if and only if public firm’s marginal
cost is constant, and (b) when the coefficients in quadratic terms of both public and private firms
is large. When (c) holds, free entry market may yield multiple equilibria. Moreover, our results
suggest that the number of firms may not be an appropriate measure of competitiveness in mixed
oligopolies under endogenous degree of privatization.
19Remember that firm 0’s marginal cost is increasing in q0.
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Figure 3-1
Figure 3-3
Figure 3-2
Figure 3-4
Figure 3: Numerical examples of firm 1’s profit where a = 10, γ0 = 2, and γ1 = γ2 = 1. κ0 =
0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 in Figures 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4, respectively.
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We assume that all firms are domestic. In the literature on mixed oligopolies, the nationality of
both public and private firms affects the equilibrium outcomes, especially the optimal privatization
policy.20 Moreover, the trade policy may affect the optimal privatization policy, and vice versa
(Chang, 2005, 2007). We presume that the new entry of private firms is less likely to raise the
incumbent private firms’ profit when the new entrants are foreign firms. Future research should
thus extend our analysis in this direction.
We focus on privatization policy and do not consider other policies, such as industrial policies
or regulations. Moreover, we focus on entry decisions and the quantity choice of the firms, and do
not consider other strategic actions such as R&D investments. For example, we assume that both
production and entry costs are exogenous, but these may depend on both the policies and firms’
actions. Future research should examine these factors.21
20Whether the private firm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed
oligopolies. For the discussion on the nationality of private firms, see Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal
(1996), Pal and White (1998), Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005 a,b), and Chang and Ryu (2015). For the discussion
on the nationality of public firms, see Lin and Matsumura (2012) and Sato and Matsumura (2019).
21For a discussion on entry taxes in mixed oligopolies, see Cato and Matsumura (2013). For the strategic manip-
ulation of F by private firms or the government in free entry markets, see Matsumura and Yamagishi (2017a,b)
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Appendix A
X1 := ((1 + κ)(a− γ0) + n(a− γ)(α+ κ0))
2 + (2α+ κ0)((1 + κ)(a− γ0)− n(γ0 − γ))
2
+ n(2 + κ)((α+ κ0)(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)
2,
X2 := α((1 + κ)
2(a− γ0)− n(n+ 2)(γ0 − γ) + κn(a− 2γ0 + γ))− n(γ0 − γ + κ0(a− γ)),
X3 := (2α+ κ0)((1 + κ1)(a− γ0)− (γ0 − γ1))
2 + (2 + κ1)((α+ κ0)(a− γ1)
+ γ0 − γ1)
2 + ((1 + κ1)(a− γ0) + (α+ κ0)(a− γ1))
2,
X4 := (α(a− 4γ0 + 3γ1 + κ1(3a− 4γ0 + γ1) + κ
2
1(a− γ0))− (κ0(a− γ1) + γ0 − γ1)),
X5 := α(a+ γ2) + γ0 − (1 + 2α)γ1 + (a− 2γ1 + γ2)κ0 + (αa+ γ0 − (1 + α)γ1)κ2 + (a− γ1)κ0κ2,
X6 := α(a+ γ1) + γ0 − (1 + 2α)γ2 + (a− 2γ2 + γ1)κ0 + (αa+ γ0 − (1 + α)γ2)κ1 + (a− γ2)κ0κ1,
X7 := (2α+ κ0)(a− 3γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + κ1(a− 2γ0 + γ2) + κ2(a− 2γ0 + γ1) + κ1κ2(a− γ0))
2
+ (2 + κ2)(α(a+ γ2) + γ0 − (1 + 2α)γ1 + (a− 2γ1 + γ2)κ0 + (αa+ γ0 − (1 + α)γ1)κ2
+ (a− γ1)κ0κ2)
2 + (2 + κ1)(α(a+ γ1) + γ0 − (1 + 2α)γ2 + (a− 2γ2 + γ1)κ0
+ (αa+ γ0 − (1 + α)γ2)κ1 + (a− γ2)κ0κ1)
2 + ((a− γ0)(1 + κ1 + κ2 + κ1κ2)
+ (α+ κ0)(2a− γ1 − γ2 + (a− γ1)κ2 + (a− γ2)κ1))
2,
X8 := (1 + κ1κ2)(a− γ0) + κ1(a− 2γ0 + γ2) + κ2(a− 2γ0 + γ1)− 2γ0 + γ1 + γ2,
X9 := a− 9γ0 + 4γ1 + 4γ2 + κ1(3a− 12γ0 + γ1 + 8γ2) + κ
2
1(a− 4γ0 + 3γ2) + κ2(3a− 12γ0 + 8γ1 + γ2)
+ κ22(a− 4γ0 + 3γ1) + κ1κ2(8a− 14γ0 + 3γ1 + 3γ2) + κ
2
1κ2(3a− 4γ0 + γ2) + κ1κ
2
2(3a− 4γ0 + γ1)
+ κ21κ
2
2(a− γ0),
X10 := (1 + κ2)
2(γ0 − γ1) + (1 + κ1)
2(γ0 − γ2)
+ κ0((1 + κ1)((a− γ2)κ1 + a+ γ1 − 2γ2) + (1 + κ2)((a− γ2)κ2 + a− 2γ1 + γ2)),
X11 := a− 9γ0 + 4γ1 + 4γ2 + κ1(3a− 12γ0 + γ1 + 8γ2) + κ
2
1(a− 4γ0 + 3γ2) + κ2(3a− 12γ0 + 8γ1 + γ2)
+ κ1κ2(8a− 14γ0 + 3γ1 + 3γ2) + κ
2
1κ2(3a− 4γ0 + γ2) + κ
2
2(a− 4γ0 + 3γ1) + κ1κ
2
2(3a− 4γ0 + γ1)
+ κ21κ
2
2(a− γ0),
X12 := 1 + 3(κ1 + κ2) + 3κ0(3 + 4(κ1 + κ2)) + 2κ1κ2(4 + 7κ0) + (1 + 4κ0)(κ
2
1 + κ
2
2)
+ κ1κ2((3 + 4κ0)(κ1 + κ2) + κ1κ2(1 + κ0)),
X13 := 3γ0 − 2γ1 − γ2 + (2γ0 − γ1 − γ2)κ1 + ((a− 2γ1 + γ2)(3 + 2κ1) + (5a− 7γ1 + 2γ2)κ2
+ (3a− 4γ1 + γ2)κ1κ2)κ0 + (γ0 − γ1)((2 + κ1)κ2 + 3κ1 + 5)κ2 + (a− γ1)(2 + κ1)κ0κ
2
2,
X14 := κ1κ2((1 + κ0)κ1κ2 + (3 + 4κ0)(κ1 + κ2) + 2(4 + 7κ0))
+ (1 + 4κ0)(κ
2
1 + κ
2
2 + 3(κ1 + κ2)) + 9κ0 + 1,
X15 := −[((a− γ2)κ
2
0 + (γ0 − γ2)κ0)κ
3
1 − ((5a+ γ1 − 6γ2)κ
2
0 + 5(γ0 − γ2)κ0)κ
2
1 + (4(2a+ γ1 − 3γ2)κ
2
0
+ (a+ 8γ0 − 2γ1 − 7γ2)κ0 + γ0 − γ1)κ1 + 4(a+ γ1 − 2γ2)κ
2
0 + (a+ 4γ0 − 3γ1 − 2γ2)κ0 + γ0 − γ1],
X16 := γ0 − γ2 + (a− γ2 − 6(γ0 − γ1))κ0 − 6(a+ γ1 − 2γ2)κ
2
0 + (4(γ0 − γ2) + (4a− 13γ0 + 6γ1 + 3γ2)κ0
− (13a+ 7γ1 − 20γ2)κ
2
0)κ1 + (4(γ0 − γ2) + (4a− 9γ0 + γ1 + 4γ2)κ0 − (9a+ 2γ1 − 11γ2)κ
2
0)κ
2
1
+ (γ0 − γ2 + (a− 2γ0 + γ2)κ0 − 2(a− γ2)κ
2
0)κ
3
1.
20
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
From (6), we obtain
∂pS(α, n)
∂n
= −
(1 + κ)(α+ κ0)((α+ κ0)(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)
((1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α))2
< 0.
From (7), we obtain
∂piS(α, n)
∂n
= −
(2 + κ)(α+ κ0)
2
(
(α+ κ0)(a− γ) + γ0 − γ
(1 + κ)(1 + κ0 + α) + n(κ0 + α)
)2
< 0. ■
Proof of Lemma 1
From (10), we obtain
∂α∗
∂n
=
(κ0(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)((a− γ0)(1 + κ)
2 + n2(γ0 − γ))
(((1 + κ)2 + κn)a− ((1 + κ)(1 + κ+ 2n) + n2)γ0 + n(2 + κ+ n)γ)2
> 0. ■
Proof of Proposition 2
Because Proposition 2(i) and Proposition 2(ii) have already been shown in Matsumura (1998)
under more general demand and cost conditions, we omit the proof. We then prove Proposition
2(iii). Substituting α∗ into (7), we obtain
piF (n) =
(κ+ 2)(n+ κ+ 1)2(κ0(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)
2
2(κ0n2 + (2κ0(1 + κ) + κ)n+ (1 + κ0)(1 + κ)2)2
. (19)
From (19), we obtain
∂piF (n)
∂n
= −
(κ+ 2)(n+ κ+ 1)(κ0(a− γ) + γ0 − γ)
2((n2 + 2(κ+ 1)n+ (κ+ 1)2)κ0 − κ− 1)
(κ0n2 + (2κ0(1 + κ) + κ)n+ (1 + κ0)(1 + κ)2)3
≷ 0
⇐⇒ (n2 + 2(κ+ 1)n+ (κ+ 1)2)κ0 − κ− 1 ≶ 0.
This implies Proposition 2(iii). ■
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting κ0 = 0 into (11), we obtain g(n) = −κ − 1 < 0. If κ0 > 0, then g(n) > 0 for a
sufficiently large n. These imply Proposition 3(ii).
If κ0 ≥ κ > 0, then g(n) is increasing in n for n > 0. Then, g(n) is positive for any n > 0
if g(0) = (κ + 1)(κ0(κ + 1) − 1) > 0. Since we suppose that κ0 ≥ κ > 0, we have g(0) > 0 if
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κ(κ+1)−1 > 0. By solving κ(κ+1)−1 = 0, we have a unique positive solution κ¯ =
√
5−1
2
≃ 0.618.
This implies Proposition 3(iii).
Since g(n) is always negative if κ0 = 0, then pi
F (n) is increasing in n for any n > 0. This
corresponds to case (a). Suppose that κ0 > 0. Then, g(n) is increasing in n for n > 0. g(n) = 0
has no positive solution if g(0) ≥ 0. Then, g(n) is always positive and piF (n) is decreasing in n for
any n > 0 if g(0) ≥ 0. This corresponds to case (b). If g(0) < 0, then g(n) = 0 has one negative
solution and one positive solution. Let n˘ be the positive solution for g(n) = 0. Then, g(n) < (>)0
if n < (>)n˘. piF (n) increases in n for n < n˘ and decreases in n for n > n˘. This corresponds to
case (c). No other case exists. These imply Proposition 3(i). ■
Proof of Proposition 4
If (13) holds (i.e., piF (0) > F ), then n = 0 never constitutes an equilibrium. We now show that
there exists unique n such that piF (n)− F = 0.
Proposition 3(i,ii) states that piF (n) is either (a) increasing in n for any n, (b) decreasing in
n for any n, or (c) inverted U-shaped, as long as αF = α∗ < 1. Proposition 1 states that when
α∗ ≥ αF = 1, piF (n) is decreasing in n. Lemma 1 states that α∗ is increasing in n. Moreover,
limn→∞ piF = 0 because limn→∞ qS(1, n) = 0 and qS(1, n) ≥ qF (n). Therefore, from the continuity
of piF , there exists at least one positive solution for piF (n)− F = 0.
Suppose (b) holds. Then, piF (n) is decreasing in n; thus, the solution for piF (n) = F is unique.
Suppose (c) holds. Let nˆ be the solution for α∗ = 1. piF is increasing in n for n < min{nˆ, n˘},
and decreasing in n for n > min{nˆ, n˘}. Therefore, the unique equilibrium for piF (n) = 0 exists.
Suppose (a) holds. piF is increasing in n for n < nˆ, and decreasing in n for n > nˆ. Therefore, the
solution for piF (n)− F = 0 is unique. These imply Proposition 4(i).
Henceforth, we consider the case in which (13) does not holds (i.e., piF (0) ≤ F ). Then, n = 0
constitutes an equilibrium. Given n = 0, the optimal degree of privatization is zero. This implies
Proposition 4(ii).
Suppose that piF (0) ≤ F . Then, n = 0 constitutes an equilibrium. In addition, suppose
g(0) < 0. From Proposition 2(iii), we have that piF is increasing in n for n < min{nˆ, n˘} and
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decreasing in n for n > min{nˆ, n˘}. Thus, if piF (0)− F is sufficiently close to zero, piF (n) = F has
two positive solutions. These imply Proposition 4(iii). ■
Proof of Proposition 5
From (16) and (18), we obtain
piTS1 − pi
DS
1 =
(2 + κ1)[(A+B)(A−B)]
2(κ1 + (1 + κ1)2 + κ0(2 + κ1)2)2(X14)2
,
where A := (κ1 + (1 + κ1)
2 + κ0(2 + κ1)
2)X13 and B := (2 + κ1)(γ0 − γ1 + κ0(a− γ1))X14.
Since we suppose that equilibrium output is positive, then qTS
1
= X13/X14 > 0. Thus, we have
X13 > 0, because X14 > 0. As a result, pi
TS
1
− piDS
1
> 0 if and only if A − B = X15κ2 +X16 > 0.
This verifies Proposition 5. ■
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